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INTRODUCTION
In Part IV of his Systematic Theology, entitled "Life and
the Spirit," Paul Tillich makes the statement:
Logically; this could be the place for a fully
developed philosophy of religion (including an interpretation of the history of religion). But practically this is impossible in the limits of this system,
which is not a sum.ma.I
This paper is an analysis of some of the implications of this
statement, that is, a study of some of the definitions, principles, and terms by which Paul Tillich has attempted to understand religion and the religious dimension of man.

By focusing

upon one part of his Systematic Theology, this paper attempts
to provide some understanding of the thought of one of the
major contemporary thinkers in the philosophy of religion.
Paul Tillich has made many recognized and oft-quoted
contributions in the philosophy of

relig~on.

That he has

influenced many contemporary philosophers and theologians is
obvious to anyone doing work in that field.

Yet, some of his

basic principles, definitions, and terms prove difficult to
understand.

His thought is often unclear because his language
often lacks precise definition and consistency; 2 Tillich

1 Pa.ul Tillich, Systematic Theol~ (Chicago: University·of
Cnicago Press, Vol. III, 1963), PP•
-5. (In this paper this
work will be abbreviated ST.)
2Tillich mentions such criticism of his work and attempts
1

2
is sometimes more the preacher than the philosopher.

His moti-

vation is sometimes more a matter of religious inspiration than
a desire for precision and consistency.3

This lack of clarity

presents some of the major difficulty in doing this paper and
at the same time furnishes a need to which this paper attempts
to respond.
This paper will analyze some of the principles, definitions,
and terms of Tillich's understanding of religion by interpreting his thought in the first division of Part IV of his Systematic
Theology.

His other works will be used only when they are help-

ful in clarifying something that he is stating in Part IV.
Secondary sources will be used sparingly where they prove helpful to' the interpretation. 4

Part IV of the Systematic Theology has two major divisions,
as do all the parts of this work.

The two parts correspond to

the basic methodology used by Tillich in his Systematic Theology,
to respond to it in his "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism,"
The Theology of Paul Tillich, edited by c. Kegley and R. Bretall
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 330.
3Ibid., 341. (In responding to the criticism that some of
his language-is baffling and his metaphors unhappy, Tillich
states his case for religious motivation being often the deciding factor).
4 Guyton B. Hammond, Man in Estrangement (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965). This work, subtitled A Comparison
of the Thought of Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm, is one of the
few secondary sources which treats Part IV of the S~stematic
Theology (and the only work which offered a detaile study of
~he importance of the concept of life for an understanding of
Tillich's thought.) Most of the standard secondary sources
concerning Tillich's thought were published before the publication of Part IV, and the few published after (Armbruster,
Tait, Hamilton) present only a·cursory treatment of Part IV
(and especially Tillich's use of the concept of life).

•

3
the method of correlation.5

F.ach part of his 8ystematic Theol-

gJS;!. consists, first, of the philosophical statement and analysis

of a problem or question and, secondly, of the theological
development of a solution or answer to that problem or question.
In the first division of Part IV of his Systematic Theology,
Paul Tillich presents his philosophical statement and analysis
of a problem-question: "Life, its Ambiguities, and the Quest for
the Unambiguous Life."

In the second division, consisting of

three sections: "The Spiritual Presence," "The Divine Spirit and
the Ambiguities of Life," and "The Trinitarian Symbols," Tillich
presents the correlate, the theQlogical development of a solution-answer: the Spirit and the Unambiguous Life.
Tillich formulates his question and answer in Part IV in
terms of life: the question posed by ambiguous life and the
answer found in unambiguous life.

The concept of life is cen-

tral to Tillich's methodology and development of his thought.
Tillich uses it eventually in Part IV to formulate his principles, definitions, and terms for an understanding of religion.
An analysis of this concept, therefore, is fundamental to any
of the other analyses of this paper and is the first goal of
this paper.
In the "Introduction" to Part IV of his Systematic Theol-

2Slt Paul Tillich faces the accusation that his attempt to
systematize theology is, in fact, an attempt "to rationalize
revelatory experiences. 116 Tillich denies the charge and retorts
5Tillich,
6 Tillich,

.§!,
fil,

Vol. I, 1951, PP• 56-66.
Vol. III, p •. 3.

•
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that the systematic form is a "justifiable demand to be consistent in one's statements."?

In addition, systematic form is

"an instrument by which relations between symbols and concepts
are discovered and by which the wholeness of the object of theology is conceived as a Gestalt in which many parts and elements are united by determining principles and dynamic interrelations."

8

Paul Tillich states his case for the necessity of using
organizing principles which go beyond biblical language, and,
therefore, the necessity of utilizing philosophical concepts,
if the revelatory experiences are to be shared with the larger
audience of mankind, the audience outside a particular "theological circle."

According to Tillich, the Christian theologian

must use non-biblical language, if his faith insights are to be
compared with, and to criticize various insights or science and
philosophy.

Otherwise, theology and the theologian's faith

exist in an isolated world, unable to speak to the world at
large and unable to be spoken to.
Tillich states the reasons for his use of the concept of
life in the first division of Part IV.

Tillich notes the encour-

agement he drew from reading Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's book,
The Phenomenon of Man.

"It encouraged me greatly to know that

an acknowledged scientist had developed ideas about the dimensions and processes of life so similar to my- own."

Paul Tillich

pt
5
summarizes his intentions for using the concept of life to
develop his thought in Part IV of his Systematic Theology:9
Of course, theology cannot rest on scientific
theory. But it must relate its understanding of man
to an understanding of universal nature, for man is
a part of nature and statements about nature underlie
every statement about him. The sections in this book
on the dimensions and ambiguities of life attempt to
make explicit what is implicit in even the most antiphilosophical theologies. Even if the questions about
the relations of man to nature and to the universe
could be avoided by theologians, they would still be
asked by people of every time and place--often with
existential urgency and out of cognitive honesty. And
the lack of an answer can become a stumbling block for
a man's whole religious life. These are the reasons
why I ventured to enter, from the theological point of
view, the field of a philosophy of life, fully aware
of the cognitive risks involved.lo
Some of the implications of this brief summary will be analyzed
in this paper •

Paul Tillich is concerned with the necessity of theology's
dialogue with the sciences, physical, social, and psychological.
He is· interested in developing his basic theological concerns
and insights in light of the concerns and insights offered by
the sciences.

Whereas the central concepts used by Tillich in

the first three parts of his Systematic Theology were more traditionally philosophical (e.g., concepts such as being, nonbeing), the central concept used in Part IV is the concept of
life.
This paper is an attempt to interpret Paul Tillich's
philosophical statement and analysis of a problem-question:
9Ibid., p. 5.
lOibid.

p
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Ambiguous life and the quest for Unambiguous life.

This will

be accomplished by a triple analysis.
In chapter one Tillich's concept of life will be analyzed.
It will be shown that an understanding of his basic definition
of life is dependent upon a definition of terms which can be
found only in some of his work written prior to Part IV of his
~stematic

Theology.

It will also be shown that Tillich's

formulation of a question and answer in terms of life is another
attempt by Tillich to point to a concern central and fundamental
in much of his thought.

By studying this fundamental concern

it is hoped that some of Tillich's thought, especially in the
philosophy of religion, will be more intelligible.
In chapter two, the concept of the self-transcendence of
life will be analyzed.

This is the fundamental characteristic

of life according to Tillich.

It is in terms of this concept

that Tillich presents ·his analysis of the ambiguity of life.
In this chapter an interpretation of Tillich's analysis of the
first two functions of life will be presented: self-integration
and self-creativity.

Tillich's analysis of these two functions

focuses upon morality and culture.

This paper hopes to present

a schema or structure by which Tillich's analysis of the first
two functions of life can be more clearly understood and which
will also provide a

means of interpreting Tillich's analysis

of the third function of life.
In chapter three Tillich's concept of the self-transcendence of life, not in its general sense as found in chapter two,
but in a more specific sense, will be analyzed.

This more

?
specific concept of the self-transcendence of life is the third
function of life and also Tillich's definition of religion.

An

analysis of this third function of life yields a clearer understanding of some of the principles, terms, and definitions of
Paul Tillich's philosophy of religion.

p

CHAPrER I
THE CONCEPT OF LIFE
What Paul Tillich attempted to say consistently in the
first three parts of his Systematic Theologl with the more traditionally philosophical concepts of being, non-being, essence,
and existence, he attempts to say consistently in Part IV with
the concepts of ambiguous and unambiguous life.

There is a

difference in emphasis, yet Tillich is attempting to share his
faith concerns and insights with man.kind, a community larger
than his particular theological circle. 1
That Tillich's use of the concept of life is important

tor understanding his work and that its use points more to a
change in emphasis than to any change in his fundamental con-

cerns and insights is supported by Guyton B. Hammond in his
book, Man in Estrangement •.2 Langdon Gilkey in his forward to
Hammond's book commends the author for pointing out the importance of the concept of life for an appreciation of Tillich's
thought3 and for showing that Tillich's tnought is not as static
1 In Part IV, published six years after Part III and twelve
years after Parts I and II, Tillich's use of the concept of life
is an attempt to enter into theology's necessary dialogue with
the sciences.
2 cf. "Introduction," n. 4.

3La~gdon Gilkey, in the foreward of Guyton B. Hammond, Man
in Estrangement (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 196'5"),"
p.

x.

8

p
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as might be suggested by the Greek categories of being and nonbeing, the terms which are so fundamental to Tillich's thought
in the first three parts of his Systematic Theology.

Hammond

suggests that Tillich in his later work, especially Part IV of
his szstematic Theologz uses the more dynamic concept of life;
yet this concept of life is built upon the categories of being
and non-being and can only be understood in terms of these categories.
We might observe here that Tillich's concept of
life contains the ideas of the overcoming of non-being,
the movement from potentiality to actuality, creativity,
self-transcendence, freedom, and self-consciousness.
Surely a concept with this richness of implication is
a key to much of Tillich's system and cannot be ignored
in any exposition of its main themes. It would appear
that many of the critical appraisals of Tillich's thought
have overlooked the centrality of this conception.4
A Definition of Terms
An understanding of Tillich's principal definition of life
("the actualization of potential being,"5).depends upon terms
which are not explicitly defined in Part IV, but whose definition must be found in some of his other works.

Such terms as

being, non-being, potential, actual must be defined before Tillich's definitions of life can be interpreted in the context of
Part IV.
Tillich defines philosophy as the cognitive endeavor concerned with being as being. 6 It is being, or the mystery of
4 Hammond, p. 107.

5Tillich,
6 Tillich,

.§!,
.§!,

Vol. III, p~ 12.
Vol. I, P• 21.
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being, which is the object of his philosophical investigations
and analyses.

It is important to attend to the fact that

Tillich makes a fundamental distinction within being itself.
His use of terms often reflects this fundamental distinction,
and this will be demonstrated in regard to the distinction
between ambiguous and unambiguous life.
There are two concepts of being. One is the result
of the most radical abstraction and means not being
this, not being that, not being anything in particular,
simply being. This indeed is an empty absolute.
The other concept of being is the result of two
profound experiences, one of them negative, the other
positive.
·
The negative experience is the shock of non-being
that can be experienced in· theoretical imagination by
those who are philosophers by nature. If one is not a
philosopher, one can have it as a simple human being,
in the practical experience of having to die.
But there is not only the shock of non-being.
There is also a positive experience. It is the experience of eros,--relation to being itself.(
These two

experi~nces

of being, the negative and positive, are

fundamental and basic to his thought.
According to Paul Tillich, the beginning of philosophical
thought is the shock of non-being.

It is man's threatened state

that causes him to wonder, to think, to organize, to figure
things out, to try to piece things together, to discover some
unity and order amid the chaos which faces him.

Non-being is

at the beginning.
Kenneth Hamilton in his book, The System and the Gospel,
severely criticizes Tillich's thought especially in regards to
what he thinks is Tillich's central problem: "an attempt to
7Paul Tillich,~ Search for.Absolutes (New York: Simon
and Schuster Press,
67), pp. 81-2.

p
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rationalize revelatory experiences. 118

Hamilton often, yet not

happily, notes the importance of such philosophical categories
as being and non-being for Tillich's philosophical theology.
Because it is solely through the anxiety born of
non-being that we encounter ontological shock and become
aware of the power of being within us, non-being is less
fatal than friendly. And we do not meet non-being on
its own but always as 'digested' within being.9
It is man's threatened state which causes him to be anxious,
in need of the "courage to be," prone to despair, and always
ready to find some security against what threatens him.

Til-

lich provides a very detailed analysis of the despair and the
anxiety resulting from this threat in his rather psychologicallyoriented book, The Courage to Be.

It is this relation of non-

being to being, the necessity of being to resist non-being that
causes Tillich to speak of the "power of being," a phrase fundamental to understanding the dialectical definition of many of
his concepts.

This is true especially for his definition of

life.
Paul Tillich focuses upon man's attempts to deal with nonbeing.

His interpretations of past philosophers and philosophies,

his own original contributions to philosophy and especially to
the philosophy of religion, are critiques of human responses and
reactions to this primary experience--the experience of being in
despair, the experience of non-being.
8 Kenneth Hamilton, The S'stem and the Gospel (Michigan:
William B. Eerdman Press, 196 ), pp. 12-13.
9Ibid., pp. 195-6.
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It cannot be otherwise, for the first step of the ·
creative philosopher is radical doubt.· He questions
not only the traditions and· symbols of the comm.unity
to which he belongs but also what is called the "natural
world view," the common-sense presuppositions of ·11 everybody." He who seriously asks the question: Why is there
something not nothing? has experienced the shock of nonbeing and has in thought transcended everything given
in nature and mankind.10
Tillich's emphasis upon the negative experience of being accounts
for his particular understanding of human life with its emphasis
upon the tragic dimensions of that life.

This will be demon-

strated especially in his critiques of morality, culture, and
religion.
The Threat of Non-being
A failure to recognize the distinctions Tillich makes in
his use of the concept of non-being leads to unnecessary confusion.
The mystery.of non-being demands a dialectical approach. The genius of the Greek language has provi~ed
a possibility of distinguishing the dialectical concept
of non-being from the non-dialectical by calling the
first me on and the second ouk on. OUk on is the
'nothing' which has no relation at all to being; me on
is the 'nothing' which has a dialectical relation to
being.11
Absolute non-being, ouk-on, is the opposite of being, its contradiction.

It has no being, no reality.

Relative non-being,

the dialectical concept of me on is a reality.

It is "within

being."
10Paul Tillich, Biblical Reli5ion and the Search for
Ultimate Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955).
11Tillich, _§!, Vol. I, pp. 187-8.
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According to Tillich, it is in Plato's philosophical thought
that the concept of non-being is for the first time dealt with
thoroughly.

Yet in Platonism non-being is an ultimate principle;

it resists being, resists form.

In Greek philosophy it becomes

an independent principle.
The me-ontic matter of Platonism represents the
dualistic element which underlies all paganism and.
which is the ultimate ground of the tragic interpretation of life.12
Tillich states that it is Christian theology which refuses to
accept that non-being is an independent principle.

It is Chris-

tian faith which struggles against all forms of dualism.

The

Christian doctrine of creation from nothing philosophically
stated, is esse qua esse est bonum.

The mythic structure of

Genesis is a struggle with the dualistic myths of Israel's
near eastern neighbors.
In Greek philosophy non-being, or matter, was an
ultimate principle, the principle of resistence against
form. Christian theology, however, has had to try to
deprive it of its independence and to seek a place for
it in the depths of the divine life.13
Yet, for all Tillich's disclaiming of dualism in the name
of Christian theology, he is still accused of surrendering to
the Greek dualism he attacks.

Hamilton quotes one of these

attacks, that of J. H. Thomas; "What Tillich has done is to
make the 'nothing' out of which we come a something with
power.

fata~

Hence, as I suggested, we are once more faced with

12Ibid., p. 188.

-

l3Ibid., pp. 179-80.

p
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])Ualism." 14

Yet Hamilton responds to Thomas' criticism of

Tillich:
The dualism which Thomas thinks he sees is a
limited dualism only, incapable of disrupting the
system's basic monism. There can be no 'fatal power'
in non-being because, whether we know it or not, the
objective situation is that being-itself is eternally
vanquishing non-being. Indeed being itself needs the
non-being it conquers, just as animals need food to
kill and eat. Without non-being being itself could
not be what it is. Man's anxiety,_ therefore, may tend
in the direction of despair but total despair is not
possible for man without total loss of his humanity.
The one effective power in the Universe is the power
manifested in eros-faith and this is the power which
(though hidden) remains always in spite of the existential predicament. After all, existence is a predicament
merely. Its chief feature is its self-contradictoriness. It contains tragic elements, but it is not tragic. 15
Tillich's ontological analysis is basically an analysis of
human existence and existence in general.

Existence is problem-

atical, yet for Tillich, not insolubly so.

What exists is that

which stands out from non-being.

Existence is a dialectical

term in Tillich's thought; it is defined in terms of non-being
at the start, but faith can displace despair.
Summarizing our etymological inquiry, we can say:
Existing can mean standing out of absolute non-being,
while remaining in it; it can mean finitude, the unity
of being and non-being. And existing can mean standing
out of ~elative non-being, while remaining in it; it
can mean actuality, the unity of actual being and the
resistance against it. But whether we use the one or
the other meaning of non-being, existence means standing out of non-being.16
Absolute non-being, ouk on, is nothing; it has no reality.
14Hamilton, p. 194.

l5Ib·d
--L· t p. 195 •
16Tillich, §!, Vol. II, P·· 21.

15
Relative non-being, me on, is within being; it has reality.
This is a distinction which is not always clearly stated in the
writings of Tillich, and this lack of clear statement

ca~

account for some of the lack of clarity in his thought and
terminology.
Relative non-being, me-on, is an expression for potentiality
in Tillich's thought.

This point is most important for under-

standing Tillich's definition of life as the "actualization of
potential being." 1 7 Relative non-being is the potential which,
along with the actual, are the two most fundamental categories
of Being in Tillich's thought.

As was just quoted: "And exist-

ing can mean standing out of relative non-being, while remaining.
in it;' it can mean actuality, the unity of actual being and the
resistence against it."

For Tillich, the existent is the actual

standing out of and within the potential.
In order ~o ·oecome actual, it must overcome relative non-being, the state of me on. But again it cannot be completely out of it. It must stand out andstand in it at the same time. An actual thing stands
out of mere potentiality; but it also remains in it.
It never pours its power of being completely into its
state of existence. It never fully exhausts its potentiality. It remains not only in absolute non-being,
as its finitude shows, but also in relative non-being,
as the changing character of its existence shows. The
Greeks symbolize this as the resistance of me-on of
relative non-being, against the actualization of that
which is potential in a thing.18
If relative non-being, me on, is the potential, then the
threat of non-being is the threat of the potential.
l7Tillich, Vol. III, p. 30.
18Tillich, _§!, Vol. II, p. 21.

Tillich's
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understanding and use of relative non-being, of potentiality,
is fundamental to his particular definition of life and especially to his understanding of the religious dimensions of
human existence.

When Tillich speaks of the tragedy of human

existence or the ambiguity of human life, or when he emphasizes
the negative experience of being in his understanding of the
religious dimension of man, he does so out of his particular
understanding and use of the concept of relative non-being as
potentiality.
Man is threatened by the shock of non-being.

Not only is

man threatened by absolute non-being, by the fact that he is
finite, (graphically expressed in the fact of death), but man
is threatened by relative-non-being, by the potential, by his
own potentiality.

For Tillich, man's greatness is in what he

can become, but man's potential greatness is also his weakness,
a constant threat.
Tillich fears man.
become.

He is afraid of what man eight do and

Human potential is often so destructive and tragic,

so self-destructive.

History and the behavioral sciences pro-

vide ample evidence of human destruction and self-destruction.
Philosophy and religion constantly attempt to minimize the risk
within man's potential greatness by their attempts at criticism
and guidance whether in terms of ethical imperatives or cultural
values.

The tragedy of human existence appears to be a more

concrete statement of the shock of

non~being.

And Tillich

appears to be duly shocked in many of his analyses of the structures of human existence whether it be human freedom, human

17
knowledge, or human creativity. Paul Tillich, the Protestant
philosopher, 19 is afraid of man's "good works." To put it
more philosophically, human potentiality is ambiguous: "The
tragic is the inner ambiguity of human greatness." 20 The root
of Tillich's emphasis upon the negative and tragic in human
life is in the ambiguity of man's non-being, his potentiality.
At the moment when man becomes conscious of his
freedom the awareness of his dangerous situation gets
hold of him. He experiences a double threat, which
is rooted in his finite freedom and expressed in anxi•
ety. Man experiences the anxiety of losing himself by
not actualizing himself and his potentialities and the
anxiety Of losing himself by actualizing himself and
his potentialities. He stands between the preservation
of his dreaming innocence without experiencing the
actuality of being and the loss of his innocence through
knowledge, power, and guilt. The anxiety of this situation is the state of temptation. Man decides for selfactualization, thus producing the end of dreaming innocence.21
A Search for Limits: A Fundamental Concern
Man has within his being non-being.

He is in the state of

temptation; he has everything to gain, everything to lose.
s-ituation is ambiguous and distorted.

His

The question .facing Til-

lich is: What can resolve this ambiguity?

What will determine

whether human life becomes creative and self-affirming or tragic
l9G. McLean, "Paul Tillich's ~istential Philosophy of
Protestantism," Thomist, Vol. 28 (Jan., 1964), pp. 1-50. McLean
mentions how much Tillich's Lutheran Protestant heritage has
influenced many of the emphases in his thought, especially his
emphasis upon the negative aspects of being, life, and religion.
This relationship accounts for the rather strange combination of
words: Protestant Philosopher.
20Tillich, §!, Vol. III, p. 34.
21 Tillich, §.!, Vol. II, p. 35.
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and self-destructive?

For Tillich, man is faced with the neces-

sity of finding limits, creative limitations for his own potentiality.

Much of Tillich's thought and especially his treatment

of ambiguous and unambiguous life is an attempt to face this
fundamental problem, to delineate the correct limits, to define
how man's potential should be actualized.

It is in terms of

these limitations and definitions that·.Tillich attempts to
understand the structures of human existence (as will be seen
in chapter two), and it is in these terms that Tillich attempts
to understand the religious dimension of human existence (as
will be seen in chapter three).
According to Paul Tillich, with the proper and correct
limits, man's non-being can be creative, freeing, loving, selfaffirmative; without limits, or with improper and incorrect
limits, human potentiality is self-destructive, hateful, licentious, and tragic.
potentiality?

What are these creative limits for man's

What are the protective curbs for man's drives?

What makes potential self-destruction an actual fulfillment?
In this paper Tillich's attempt to answer these questions in
terms of ambiguous and unambiguous life, the fundamental concepts of Part IV of his Systematic Theology, will be analyzed.
An attempt to answer this question of limits is central and

fundamental to Tillich's thought.

It expresses his basic method,

the method of correlation and it is found ultimately in his
analysis of the religious dimension of man.

According to Til-

lich, religion and theology are primarily concerned with the
setting of limits.

How well any religion or theology or quasi-

---

•,
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religious answer succeeds in this task is a question to be continually asked as the attempted answers are subjected to criticism and evaluation.
What are the proper and correct limits for man's potentiality,?

What are the forms that can creatively shape human life,

that can resist non-being?

Or to put it in another way, what

are the structures, whether they be mythic, symbolic, or conceptual, which can resist and order the chaos?

Tillich summarizes

his answer in his treatment of justice, the seeking for proportion, form, and balance.

In his book Love, Power and Justice it

is justice which delimits and defines the love and power of man.
It is difficult to read the book without hearing in the background Saint Paul's and, later, Luther's cries to rid man of his
injustice and to find for him some justification, some new order
of things.

"To be just towards oneself means to actualize as

many ·potentialities as possible without losing oneself in disruption and chaos. 1122
Tillich's attempt to answer the question of creative limits
for human potentiality and to evaluate the answers of others, be
they philosophical, theological, or quasi-religious, is rooted
in his conviction, prejudiced as it may be by his Christian
faith, that the criterion of any creative limit for man is the
definite demanding - other which stands "over against" man.
It is the definite other which sets the bounds, provides the
limits, makes possible creative action, and indeed demands
22 Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1954), p.

?o.
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self-creative action.

It is the definite other which keeps man

from destroying himself, by not allowing him to forget his
limitations and insuf'ficiencies, by not allowing him to be more
than a man, and therefore, less than a man.
According to Tillich, it is the definite other as object
which makes knowledge and truth possible and illusion and subjectivism impossible.

Tillich clearly ·states this need for the

definite other when he speaks of human freedom:
\lb.en man makes himself the center of the universe,
freedom loses its definiteness. Indefinitely and arbitrarily, freedom turns to objects, persons, and things
which are completely contingent upon the choosing subject and which therefore can be replaced by others of
equal contingency and ultimate unrelatedness. Existentialism, supported by depth psychology, describes the
dialectics 8f this situation in terms of the restlessness, emptiness, and meaninglessness connected with it.
If no essential relation between a free agent and his
objects exist, no choice is objectively preferable to
any other; no commitment to a cause or a person is
m~aningful; no dominant purpose can be established.
The indications coming from one's destiny remain
unnoticed or are disregarded. This certainly is the
description of an extreme situation; but in its radicalism it can reveal a basic trend in the state of universal estrangement.23
According to Tillich it is this definite otherness which
makes love and morality possible and selfishness and cynicism
impossible.
For in man's essential nature the desire to be
united with the object of one's love for its own sake
is effective. And this desire is not infinite but
definite. It is not concupiscence but love • • • 24
It is this definite otherness which stands "over against"
man that keeps him humble, that gives form to his unlimited
2 3Tillich,
24

§!,

Ibid.' p. 54.

Vol. III, p. 63.
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potentialities, that makes his potentiality non-threatening.
It is this definite otherness which makes man aware of his finitude.

It is this definite otherness which is the antidote to

man's tendency to deify his thoughts, his ideas, his choices,
his actions.

In this context Tillich's constant fashioning of

the enemy in terms of the demonic, the idolatrous, the blasphemous appears to be an appropriate way of accusing man of the
fanaticism and arbitrariness that rests within him.
Tillich often attempts to make his case by pointing to the
subject of Greek tragedy:
Man is tempted to make himself existentially the
center of himself and his world. When looking at himself and his world, he realizes his freedom and, with
it, his potential infinity. He realizes that he is
not bound to any special situation or element in it.
But at the same time, he knows that he is finite. It
was this situation which induced the Greeks to call
men "the mortals" and to attribute man's potential
infinity to the gods, calling them "the immortals."
Man could create the images of the immortal gods only
because he was aware of his own potential infinity.
Standing between actual finitude and potential infinity
enables him to call men and only men "mortals" (although
all beings have to die) and to call the divine images
of men the"immortals." If man does not acknowledge
this situation - the fact that he is excluded from the
infinity of the gods - he falls into hubris. He elevates himself beyond the limits of his finite being and
provokee the divine wrath which destroys him. This is
the main subject of Greek tragedy.25
To summarize, man is shocked by non-being.
within himself.

He has non-being

Man's situation is ambiguous because his great

potential can either create him or destroy him.
lies in the correct and proper limit.

The ·difference

Man finds his creative

limit in the other, the basis of truth and love, the basis of
2 5Tillich,

fil,

Vol. II, pp. 49-50.
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every attempt of man to formulate and use religious spee·ch and
symbolism.

It is the other which keeps man honest and humble.

It is the other which can save him from himself.
stated, no man can save himself.

Theologically

Man is saved by God alone.

The distinction of being and non-being is fundamental to
Tillich's thought.

The shock of non-being is the beginning of

human questioning and the possibility of attempting some answers.
The threat of non-being is the threat of man's own unlimited
potentiality.
remedy.

The threat becomes a promise given the right

Man's greatness is in the fact that he has so much

non-being.
Life: A More Inclusive Definition
Tillich's definition of life and his use of this concept
in Part IV of his Systematic Theology is fundamentally rooted
in his understanding of the distinction between being and nonbeing especially as this distinction underlies his meaning when
he states that life is "the actualization of potential being."
Tillich begins Part IV of his Systematic Theology by defining his use of the concept of life.

He states that many phil-

osophers have tended to avoid the word because of its various·
meanings while others have tended to restrict it to the organic
world.

Tillich intends to give the concept a specific meaning,

but he refuses to restrict it to the organic world of living
things.

For Tillich, it will be defined in a specific but

broad sense.
In rejecting the term "process" in favor of "life" as the
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fundamental concept for his thought in Part IV Tillich graphically states his basic feeling for this concept to which he will
later give more precise definition.
The term "process" is much less equivocal than
the term "life" but also much less expressive. The
living and dead body are equally subject to "Process,"
but in the fact of death, "life" includes its own
negation. The emphatic use of the word "life" serves
to indicate the conquest of this negation - as in
"life reborn" or in "eternal life •. 11 26
In his attempt to define the concept of life, which hints
at the way he will use it in the development of the thought,
Tillich first mentions the polar concept of life.

It is polar

because it implies its opposite, and is in dialectical tension
with its opposite.

"Perhaps it is not too bold to assume that

the words for life first arose through the experience of death.
In any case, the polarity of life and death has always colored
the word 'life.• 2 7
From the polar concept of life Tillich moves to the generic
concept, "a special group of existing beings under the predominance of the organic dimension. 1128
But it is Tillich's intention to further define and broaden
the concept of life.

The ontological concept of life is formed

after the pattern of the generic concept of life.
The observation of a particular potentiality of
being, whether it is that of a species or of individuals actualizing themselves in time and space, has
led to the ontological concept of life - life as the
26

Tillich,

27Ibid.
28 Ibid.

-

£!,

Vol. III, p. 11.
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"actuality of Being." 29
It is the ontological concept of life, as defined by Tillich
in the very beginning of Part IV, which focuses his a tten.tion
upon what is to be investigated in Part IV.
The ontological concept of life liberates the word
"life" from its bondage to the organic realm and elevates
it to the level of a basic term that can be used within
the theological system only if interpreted in Existential
terms. The term "process" is not open to such interpretation, although in many instances it is helpful to speak
of life processes.30
Life, like potency and act, focuses Tillich's attention
upon the basic structures of being.

For Tillich the structures

of being shape all reality and these structures reveal being to
be in a state of tension.

This state of tension can be objec-

tively' analyzed by the philosopher in many different ways, but,
as Tillich states it, this tension only has significance for the
theologian when it is interpreted in existential terms, that is,
in terms of the felt rieeds arising from an encounter with the
negative dimensions of being and life.

For Tillich, existence

bespeaks predicament, estrangement, and tragedy.
threat of non-being, the ambiguity of his life.

Man feels the
Philosophical

and theological language cannot abstract from the concrete
existential situation.

The shock of non-being, often cast in

terms of dread, despair, and anxiety, and the experience of being,
in terms of promise, faith, and mystery, that is, "interpreted
in Existential terms," meet Tillich's needs as a philosopher
and Christian theologian.
29Ibid.

-

30~.
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The Spiritual Dimension: A Question of Metaphors
Since the ontological concept of life is broader and more
inclusive than the ordinary meaning of life, Tillich is cautious
in how he will express the unifying aspect of a concept which
includes such a diversity of beings.

In his essential consider-

ation of life, Tillich speaks of a "multidimensional unity of
life. 11

Tillich is faced with a decision concerning which terms

he will use to seek and describe this unity of diversity.

Con-

fronted with this problem of the one and the many, Tillich's
solution is in terms of the proper metaphors to be used when
describing the multidimensional unity of life.
Tillich shows which metaphors he will accept and which
metaphors he will exclude in describing life.

When speaking

of life, Tillich intends to speak of the "dimensions of life,"
and not the "levels of life."
The term 'level' is a metaphor which emphasizes
the equality of all objects belonging to a particular
level. They are 'leveled,' that is, brought to a
common plane and kept on it. There is no organic
movement from one to the other; the higher is not
implicit in the lower, and the lower is not implicit
in the higher. The relation of the levels is th~f
o.f interference, either by control or by revolt.~
The metaphor 'level' betrays its inadequacy when
the relation of different levels is under consideration. The choice of the metaphor had far-reaching
consequences for the whole cultural situation. And,
conversely~ the choice itself expressed a cultural
situation.72
Tillich in this last quotation is especially referring to the

31~.' p. 13.
32~., p. 14.
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way of describing the relation of the inorganic to the organic
in certain scientific theories, but his opposition to the use
of the metaphor of "level" when speaking of the plurality of
beings included in the concept of life is even more comprehensive than t.his particular relationship.

For Tillich, the

metaphor of "level" is reductionist and reifying, a matter
bespeaking mutual separation and interference.

Tillich exem-

plified his position by showing how problems arise when "level"
is used in speaking of such traditional relationships as the
organic to the inorganic, nature to grace, faith to reason,
mind to body, religion to cultU+-e, and God to man.33
Whereas the metaphor of "level" tends to emphasize differ.ence and conflict, the metaphor of "dimension" tends to "represent an encounter with reality in which the unity of life is
seen above its conflicts."

For Tillich, the metaphor of "dimen-

sion" implies a different vision of reality, that is, different
from the vision implied in the metaphor of "level."
The metaphor "dimension" is also taken from the
spatial sphere, but it describes the difference of the
realms of being in such a way that there cannot be
mutual interference. Depth does not interfere with
breadth, since all dimensions meet in some point.
They cross without disturbing each other; there is no
conflict between dimensions.54
For Tillich, the basic dimensions of life are the
the organic, the spiritual, and the historical.

inorga~ic,

All four are

actual in man, although man is especially characterized by the
spiritual and historical.
33

~., PP• 12-15.

34 Ibid., p. 15.

The his toric·a1 dimension is Tillich's
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concern in Part V of his Systematic Theolo&, "History and the
Kingdom of God."

It is the spiritual dimension, however, which

is Tillich's concern in Part IV.

It is under this dimension

that Tillich discusses the various ambiguities of life, offers
his definition of religion and, in the second division of Part

IV, analyzes the religious symbol of the Spirit as one of the
three religious symbols for the unambiguous life, the one under
the dimension of the spirit or under the spiritual dimension.
Tillich defines "spirit" as the "unity of power and meaning," "the unity of life-power and life in meanings."35

It is

in terms of this power and meaning that Tillich analyzes the
personal, interpersonal, and transpersonal structures of human
existence.

Tillich presents a brief etymology of the word

"spirit," and some of its semantic problems for the contemporary,
especially English speaking man.

Yet, Tillich thinks a new

understanding of the term "spirit" is a necessity.

Other words

to describe this "unity of power and meaning" dimension of
life, such as soul, mind, reason, and intellect, tend to differentiate man from the rest of nature, but at the expense of
rationalizing, intellectualizing, or individualizing him.3 6
Although Tillich's concern in Part IV is primarily with
the spiritual dimension, what he says about it is often in terms
of its relationship to the inorganic and organic dimensions.
Remember that Tillich introduces Part IV of his Systematic
35Ibid.' p. 22.
3Gibid., pp. 21-4.

-
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by stating that theology "must relate its understanding
-Theology
of nature, for man is a part of nature and statements about
nature underlie every statement about him."37

And, although

Tillich's concept of life is not restricted to the organic
dimensions, it is built upon it.

"The organic dimension is

characterized by self-related, self-preserving, self-increasing,
and self-continuing Gestalten ('living wholes'). 11 38 It is
upon this model of the organic dimension that Tillich bases his
analysis of the spiritual dimension.

·This will be shown in the

next chapter where Tillich's concept of the self-transcendence
of life, as the fundamental characteristic of life, is analyzed.
Tillich is concerned with the language he must use to speak
about life, with the metaphors and imagery he will use to specify
the proper object of his study.

With the wrong metaphors at the

beginning of his study, human life will be isolated within itself
and in conflict with other dimensions of being.
A Summary of Chapter One
In Part IV of his Systematic Theology Paul Tillich is concerned with ambiguous life and the quest for the unambiguous
life under the dimension of the spirit.

As we have seen, the·

key words--how and why they are used--are of great
for Tillich's thought.

So far we have looked at the words:

life, dimension, and spiritual.
37Ibid., P• 5.

38~.'

p. 20.

importanc~

Before we could analyze Tillich's
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concept of life we first had to briefly define the terms which
he uses in his basic definition of life:·being and non-being.
We had to analyze especially Tillich's concept of non-being and,
thereby, conclude that relative non-being for Tillich is potentiality.

Man threatened by his own unlimited potentiality.

In reviewing some of Tillich's basic terminology in order
to be able to understand his basic definition of life, we are
confronted by a central question or problem which Tillich
attempts to answer in his work: What are the creative limits
for man's potentiality?
destruction?

What will keep man from tragic self-

It is this question of creative limits which

Tillich attempts to answer in terms of the fundamental characteristic of life, the self-transcendence of life.

In chapter

two of this paper the general concept of the self-transcendence
of life will be analyzed.

CHAPTER II

THE GENERAL CONCEPr OF THE Shl.iF-TRANSCENDENCE OF LIFE
Life is the "actualization of potential being. 111
existential actualization is ambiguous.

This

The ambiguity is in the

fact that this actualization can be positive, creative, and
"great," or negative, destructive and "tragic. 112

Tillich is

faced with the problem-question: if the actualization of potential being is ambiguous, if it can be great or tragic, how can
this ambiguity be resolved?

How can this actualization of

potential oeing be determined for the positive and against the
negative?

What limits can be set to provide for a creative

actualization of potential being?
·Hammond svates tliat Tillich in Part IV places importance
upon the distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous life
because life in growth or change is threatened with the loss
of identity and especially because human activity may lead to
"chaotic indeterminancy."3

Life as ambiguous is an existential

question; life as unambiguous is an answer.

Tillich is being

faithful to his method of correlation: life as we experience it
1 Tillich, §_!, Vol. III, P• 30.
2 Ibid., P• 94.
3Hammond, p. 100.
30
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is problematic and questionable; answer and solution are theological tasks.

The theological answer is in terms of Spirit,

a symbol for Unambiguous life.

Life without threat is the

promise underlying Christian faith's response to a threatening
situation.
Transcendence and the Self-transcendence of Life
Tillich's main concern in his existential consideration of
life is the ambiguous nature of actualization, the threatening
aspects of growth, change, self-preservation, and creativity.
For Tillich, these growing, changing, self-preserving, creative
aspects of life, these movements beyond, this actualization of
potential being, are the transcending movements of life, the
transcendence of life.
Since Tillich's specific concern in Part IV is life in the
spiri·tual dimension, liis concern with the transcendence of life
in Part IV is primarily an analysis of human transcendence, or
self-transcendence.

For Tillich, the two principal moments of

human self-transcendence are human knowledge and love.

Tillich's

analysis of the cognitive and moral activity of man, therefore,
is his main means of considering the existential aspects of life:
the ambiguity of human self-transcendence.
At the end of his essential consideration of life, Tillich
discusses the spiritual dimension's relationship to the dimensions preceding it and upon which it is built.

He cites two

examples.to show the relationship: an analysis of the cognitive
act and an analysis of the moral act.

In discussing these two
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central and fundamental acts of the spiritual dimension, Tillich
reveals his basic use of the word "transcendence."
First, Tillich gives his analysis of the cognitive act:
The transcendence of the center over the psychological
material makes the cognitive act possible, and such an
act is a manifestation of spirit. We said that the
personal center is not identical with any one of the
psychological contents, but neither is it another element added to them; if it were this, it would be psychological material itself, and not the bearer of the
spirit. Nor is the personal center strange to the
psychological material. It is their psychological·
center, but transformed into the dimension of the
spirit. The psychological center, the subject of selfawareness, moves in the realm of higher animal life as
a balanced whole, organically or spontaneously (but not
mechanically) dependent on the total situation. If the
dimension of the spirit dominates a life process, the
psychological center offers its own contents to the unity
of the personal center. This happens through deliberation and decision. In doing so it actualizes its own
potentialities, but in actualizing its own potentialities, it transcends itself. This phenomena can be experienced in every cognitive act.4
Secondly, Tillich gives his analysis of the moral act:
Here also a large amount of material is present in
the psychological center-drives, inclinations, more or
less compulsory trends, moral experiences, ethical traditions and authorities, relations to other persons,
social conditions. But the moral act is not the diagonal in which all these vectors limit each other and
converge; it is the centered self which actualizes itself as a personal self by distinguishing, separating,
rejecting, preferring, connecting, and in doing so,
transcending its elements.~
In both of these brief analyses Tillich focuses upon that
aspect of life which makes growth and "movement beyond" possible.
This transcendence of life or, more specifically, the self4 Tillich, ST, Vol. III, p. 27 (The underlining, except
their, is not Tiilich's.)

-

5Ibid., pp. 27-8 (The unde·rlining is not Tillich's).
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transcendence of life in terms of human knowledge and morality,
is not just one aspect among many aspects of life, but the fundamental characteristics of life.

Hammond points this out and

at the same time makes some distinctions which underlie Tillich's
met.hodology in presenting his existential consideration of life.
The power of life, finally, is the power of selftranscendence! • • • Tillich at one point seeks to preserve a distinction between that going out of itself
which we have identified as the self-creativity of life
and the function of self-transcendence as such. According to this distinction, creativity appears on the horizontal level, while transcendence suggests that function
of life whereby it rises above itself vertically in the
direction of the infinite • • • • Later, however, Tillich
acknowledges that self-transcendence cannot be viewed
as a separate function of life, but must be understood
as an aspect or quality of the other functions {in human
life, self-integration or morality as well as self-creation or culture.) For our purposes, therefore, selftranscendence may be viewed as the most significant
aspect of that going out of itself which constitutes
life. It is to be found in all levels or "dimensions"
of life but comes to its fullest realization in man • • • •
The power of self-transcendence can be identified
as the power of being to overcome non-being.b
This "going out of itself which constitutes life,"

~elf

transcendence, this "power of being to overcome non-being" is
man's greatness and also his weakness.

In his description of

man's self-transcendence, Tillich's emphasis upon the tragic
and negative is constant.

The root problem is, as it was shown

in the first chapter, the problem of relative non-being, the
ambiguous actualization of human potentiality.

The concept of

non-being is central to Tillich's understanding of human selftranscendence and especially to his emphasi
and negative dimensions.
6

'

Hammond, pp. 104-5.
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Tillich described in more metaphysical terminology in the first
three parts of his Systematic Theology, is again stated in
Part IV but from a different vantage point and with different
terminology.
being.

Yet the problem is the same: the threat of non-

Hammond points out this recurring concern in Tillich's

thought.
As the system develops, however, it becomes clear
that Tillich's distinction is not so much between being
and becoming as between "ambiguous" and "unambiguous"
life. In the former, self-transcendence threatens the
loss of self-id~ntity: creativity may lead to a chaotic
indeterminancy. 'I
But whether in terms of being, becoming, and the overcoming
of non-being or in terms of ambiguous or unambiguous life, the
emphasis upon risk, upon the ambiguity of the human situation,
upon the tragic and negative is central and fundamental to
Tillich's thought.

Tillich states:

The process of self-transcendence carries a double
meaning in each of its moments. At one and the same
time it is an increase and a decrease ·in the power of
being.8 • • • in every act of human creativity the element of separation from the creativ~ ground is effective. Human creation is ambiguous.~
And Hammond responds:
In ·these statements as elsewhere Tillich is suggesting that the basic movement of life contains both
a positive and negative aspect. This means, in effect,
that life is tragic. It becomes separated from its
source and ground by its own greatness, its own selftranscendence and creativity.10
?Ibid., P• 100.
8 Tillich, _§!, Vol. II, p. 190.

9~., P• 256.
10Hammond, p. 108.
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In summary, human life is threatened by its own possibilities.

In transcending itself it. tends to lose itself.

In moving

beyond and forward it tends to lose its ground and its direction.
In doing something new it tends to lose itself in novelty and
strangeness.
Two Corresponding Realities: A Schema
I

In order to better Understand Tillich's consideration of the
ambiguity of human self-transcendence and what is needed to resolve this ambiguity, that is, in order to better understand
his analyses of culture, morality, and religion (the main focuses
in his existential consideration of life), a schema will be

pre~_

sented which is a possible way of understanding the basic structure of Tillich's thought in these analyses.
For Tillich, the self-transcendence of life is the fundamental characteristic·of life and it is in terms of this selftranscendence that Tillich analyzes life's ambiguities. -corresponding to this self-transcendence of life and providing it
with possible determination or limitation, is the experience of
the transcendent.

It is in terms of this experience of the

transcendent that Tillich proposes a possible resolution to
life's ambiguities.
The self-transcendence of life means that life goes beyond
itself.

It states that life is "a centrally intended movement

ahead, a going out from a center of action. 1111
11 Tillich, .2,!, Vol. III, P• 30.

The experience
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of the transcendent states that there is a beyond, an ahead to
which life moves, a goal or purpose.

It states that life's

movement is shaped, oriented, directed, defined, and limited
by what is ahead and beyond.

What can shape and orient life

and ensure that its movement ahead will be creative and not
destructive, can, for Tillich, be answered ultimately only in
theological terms.

But the possibility of an answer, a possible

solution, is proposed by Tillich in his philosophical statement
and analysis of the problem.
For Tillich, the human experience of the transcendent is
the experience of limitation, the experience of the limitations
within which the actualization of human potentiality can be
creative and great.

This experience is expressed in such terms

as the "beyond," "the not-me," "the other," "the divine within
me."

For Tillich the experience of limitation, or limits, is

most profoundly realized in terms of moral obligation, demands
of objective truth, and the religious language and symbols which
point man to deeper dimensions within and outside of himself.
Without this experience of limits, man forgets his own limitedness, and in doing so is threatened with his own potentiality.
Hence there is a need for creative limits.
To summarize, the self-transcendence of life is the ambi'""Uous going out of life beyond itself and the correlate experience
of the transcendent is the experience of the limitation, limits,
and limitedness within which this going· out can be rendered
creative, positive, and "great."

The self-transcendence of

life is ambiguous, threatened with self-destructiveness and the
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risk of tragedy when the actualization of potential being is·
indeterminate, when life moves beyond itself without limits, or
without proper and adequate limits.

In other words, and .this

will be seen in what follows, life is in need of limits, norms,
values, criteria, absolutes.

This is an abstract statement of

the basic framework of Tillich's thought in Part IV of his
Systematic Theology:.
Tillich proceeds in his existential consideration of life
by analyzing the three functions of life, the three aspects of
the self-actualization of life (which in his analysis he correlates to the three functions of the spirit: morality, culture,
and religion):

1) self-integration where he specifically treats.

morality in terms of the self-transcendence of life and the
experience of the transcendent, 2) self-creativity where he
specifically treats culture and in the same terms, and 3) the
self~transcendence

of "life where he treats religion and defines

it in terms of a specific concept of self-transcendence and a
specific experience of the transcendent.
The three functions of life are all aspects of the selfactualization of potential being.

Self-transcendence applies to

all three generally and in a specific sense to the third function of life.

All three functions as seen under the spiritual

dimension are "intended movements ahead," "goings out from a
center."

It is, however, in the third function of life that

"life goes out of itself as finite life. 1112

The first two
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functions remain within the limits of finite life.
function the limits of finite life are surpassed.

In the third
In this func-

tion the experience of the transcendent is described in terms of
the sublime, the infinite, the sacred, the holy--the vocabulary
which Tillich uses to express the religious experience of the
transcendent.
Before the specific concept of the self-transcendence of
life is considered and, with it, the religious experience of the
transcendent, the general concepts of each should be considered
as Tillich applies them to the first two functions of life.
The First Function of Life: Self-integration
The first function of life is the self-integration of life.
In this function "centeredness is actualized. 111 3

Not only is

each function correlated to one of the functions of the spirit,
for example, the function of self-integration to the function
of morality, but each function is described in terms of the
three polarities in the structure of existence: individualization and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny .14
The first function of life is described in terms of the
polarity of individualization and participation.

Given this

polarity life in .the first function can disintegrate in one of
l3Ibid., P• 31.
14Tillich, ST, Vol. I, pp. 174-86. (Tillich treats these
polarities in a section entitled,· 11 The Ontological Elements."
These elements are qualities, or tensions, in everything, providing Tillich with an ontological structure for systematic
analysis of various topics.)
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two directions.

It can be too centered on the side of i'ndividu-

alization, or too dispersed on the side of participation.
either case, "the center is lost."

In

To exemplify this, Tillich

offers a critique of stimulus-response theories of life which
"when raised to absolute validity • • • are not models of
healthy life but of life in disintegration. 111 5

Man as a mere

reactor to outside stimuli loses his center and individuality.
Impulsiveness displaces responsible activity.

A moral center

tends to be a useless category when man defines himself as
determined, if not vlctimized, by a world of varied stimuli.
Tillich's analysis of the first function of life, namely,
self-integration, is made primarily in terms of the spiritual
dimension and in this case in terms of morality, one of the
three functions of the spirit.

Tillich defines morality as

"the function of life in which the centered self constitutes
itself as a person."
of the spirit. 1116

"Morality is the constitutive function

In terms of self-transcendence it can be

said that man transcends himself in such a way that the whole
world is at his disposal or for his use.

In this context there

can be self-increasing and self-alteration.
all, he can incorporate all.
and his limitedness.

Man can assimilate

Yet man experiences limitation

He experiences a something which tells

him that the whole world is not at his disposal, or for his use.
He experiences a true limit.
l5Tillich,
16

§!,

Ibid., p. 38.

This, for Tillich, is the beginning

Vol. III, p. 35.
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of the moral experience, and the basis for true centeredness;
the foundation of morality.

To put it simply, man is faced

with another person, another self, something not disposable,
something not usabTe.

Although the vocabulary is different,

Tillich's thought here is quite similar to the thought of Martin
Buber especially in terms of the latter's basic distinction
between the I-Thou and the I-it. 17 It is in this basic experience of "person in encounter with other persons," that .Tillich
attempts to ground the moral imperative, the foundations of
demand, coI:1I11and, and the "ought-to-be."

Tillich confronts

pragmatic and utilitarian theories in terms of their inability
to provide moral limits, that is, norms and absolutes •
...

Therefore, the other self as. the unconditional
limit to the desire to assimilate one's whole world,
and the experience of this limit is the experience of
the ought-to-be, the moral imperative. The moral constitution of the self in the dimension of the spirit
begins with this experience. Personal life emerges in 18
the encounter of ·person with person and in no other way.
Tillich states very succinctly the problem-question ·in the
first function of life in terms of the self-transcendence of
lite and the experience of the transcendent: "We must choose
between a consistent but self-limiting building up of our life
and a breaking-through of as many limits as possible with a
loss of consistency and.direction. 1119
l?Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1958), translated by Ronald Smith.
18Tillich, §.!, Vol. II, p. 40.
l9Ibid., p. 42.
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The Concept of Eros
What Tillich is attempting to state in this part of his
Systematic Theology about morality and love, and what he will
attempt to state about culture and truth as he analyzes the
second function of life is dependent upon an understanding of
an important aspect of his thought which he refers to in Part
IV but which he does not explicitly treat: the concept of

~·

A brief analysis of this concept, based on sources other than
Part IV of his Systematic Theology, will help to clarify and
exemplify his thought at this point.

It will also help to

clarify some references he makes in Part IV to the previous
parts of his Systematic Theology.
Much of Tillich's understanding of human self-transcendence
especially in regard to his understanding of human love, is in
terms of his use of the concept of eros.

As in many other

aspects of his thought, the Greek philosophical background of
his thinking is quite apparent.

For Tillich,

~

by Plato, is the drive for the good and the true.
use of this concept of

~

as defined
Tillich's

is fundamental not only to his

understanding of love, but to his epistemology.
scribes his basic understanding of

Tillich de-

~·

.JZos--a word which is not used by biblical relithe universals, the eternal essences
(ideas), of which the concrete is only a weak imitation. ~os drives beyond the individual things and
persons. It uses the concrete as a starting point.
But then it transcends it and dissolves it into the
universal. The fulfillment of eros is the mystical
union with the one, in which all concreteness has
~ion--intui ts

....
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disappeared. 20
Statements such as this cause Hamilton to call Tillich an essentialist in the Greek tradition and to deny Tillich the title of
existentialist.

Tillich, however, attempts to qualify such

statements and, thereby, to avoid essentialism and the submergence of the individual and the person.
In describing human love, Tillich ·often contrasts the
concept of eros with the concept of agape.

It is with his use

of the concept of agape, concrete love, that Tillich attempts
to resist a degradation of the individual and of the particular in favor of the universal and essential.
focus upon the particular and individual.

Agape puts the

Agape is Christian-

ity's major contribution to the tradition of Western thought;
Christian agape refuses to allow man to escape into the safety
and security of any essentialism.

Tillich, the Christian, the

existentialist, attempts to favor the concrete, the individual,
and the particular.
is questionable.

Whether his attempt is successful or not

His claim to be an existentialist is contested.

One may ask: In making self-realization the ultimate
criterion, by defining love as the power of being toward
self-realization and the overcoming of self-destruction
does Tillich not inadvertently elevate the eros concept
over the others? Does he not incorporate the other aspects of love into the eros aspects? Is it not Plato's
eros, which seeks fulfillment through the self-realization of the individual (strengthened through the romantic
ideal of the individual personality), which determines
the temper and structure of Tillich's thought? His commitment to eros accounts for the intuition of being in
its rational form, as we find it in Tillich's writing,
20 Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Realitv (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 50.
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and for the characteristic inner dynamics of each of his
concepts, as well as for the emphasis on the creative
act, the dynamic union of the ultimate ground and the
self-objectivating form, as the redeeming act of the
spirit.21
.
~

as the

d~ive

for the good and true parallels Tillich's

basic description of self-transcendence.

Also with this concept

he criticizes the negative and tragic dimensions of human selftranscendence.

Again, he is taking a critical stance in regards

to man's potentiality, his non-being.

His fear is still the

fear of the risky not-yet.
He is critical of human pride and concupiscence.
self-destructive perversions of man's

~'

Both are

of his potentiality.

In attacking both, he is concerned with the creative limit or
form for human potentiality.
resistance to non-being.

The quest is for man's possible

Pride and concupiscence are both per-

verse in that man forsakes his creative limits, the possibilities
for

t~ue

human knowledge and love, and instead makes himself the

only center and limit.

This can be done only at the price of

eventual tragedy and self-destruction.
The great risk of self-transcendence or self-affirmation
is that man as proud removes himself from his divine center,
his only salvation, and makes himself the·center.

The tragedy

of human existence is that in seeking the whole and center,
man is separated from the whole and center.

As concupiscent,
man "desires to draw the whole of reality to self." 22 For
21 Walter Leibrecht, "Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," Reli~ion and Culture, ed. by w. Leibrecht (New York: Harper ancr--rothers, 1959), p. 26.
22Tillich,

§!,

Vol. II, p. 52.
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Tillich, the tragic and self-destructive dimensions of hi.Iman
existence are most apparent historically in terms of arbitrary
choices and subjective delusions.

Ul~imately,

the tragedy of

human life is the perversion of knowledge and love.

History is

often a record of these destructive and self-destructive perversities.
Tillich sees in Freud's concept of the Libido and in
Nietzsche's concept of the "will to power" profound analyses
of the tragic dimensions of human self-transcendence. 2 3 In
both these concepts he sees analyses of what he calls "existential concupiscence" or "distorted eros."

Freud's Libido

wants its own pleasure, not the other, as an object of love;
it is never satisfied.

Nietzsche's will to power is also an

infinite never-satisfied drive.

As Nietzsche's "will to power"

leads to self-negation so Freud's Libido leads to the deathwish.

Without definite aim, or content, without limit or object,

both Libido and "will to power" like non-being, are tragic and
self-destructive.

Potentiality without limit or without the

correct limits is tragic.

To be creative non-being needs form

and limit, goal and aim.

To be knowledge and love, there must

be the definite, determining other, an object to know or love.
In both cases it is the infinite, never satisfied
drive which leads to self-negation. Nietzsche tries to
overcome this trend by emphatically proclaiming a courage
which takes the negativities of being into itself. In
this he is influenced by Stoicism and Protestantism.
But, in contrast to both of them, he does not show the
norms and principles by which the will to power can be

23 Ibid., pp. 53-55.

-
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judged.
traits~

cence.c4

It remains unlimited and has demonic-destructive
It is another concept and symbol of concupis-

Yet Tillich's attack/is not against concupiscence, which is
the structure of human striving and drive.

The attack is against

distorted or existential concupiscence, that striving and drive
under the conditions of existence, which is separated and
"fallen" from the divine center.

For Tillich, Freud and Nietzsche

are wrong for identifying the existential with the essential and
for accepting the distortion as the only reality.

Tillich's

criticism of Freud and Nietzsche for accepting the existential
as the only reality is a concrete expression of his basic apologetics.

For Christian Tillich, sin and estrangement are not

ultimate and final, but correction, redirection and redemption
are possible.
But like Freud's "Libido," Nietzsche's "will to
power" is also blurred if described in such a way that
the distinction between man's essential self-affirmation
and his existential striving for power of being without
limit is not clearly established.25
Like his mentor, Plato, Tillich is in search of form.

It

is Tillich who states that "life meets the threat of growth by
creating forms of growth. 1126

Human self-transcendence, if it

is to overcome the threat of self-loss and self-destruction, if
it is to find fulfillment in terms of knowledge and love, ne€ Ls
direction and limitation.
24

The threat of non-being, the risk of

Ibid., P• 55.

25~.
26 Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1954), p. 54.
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human potentiality, can only be overcome if human self-transcendence comes to terms with the definite and objective other which
is the antidote for the arbitrary and subjective.

----

Human eros

can find fulfillment with the limitations and objective concerns
provided by the Christian's agape.

Agape with its focus upon

the concrete and individual, upon the particular here-and-now
can give form to an

~

in need of limits.

the drive is fatal and self-destructive.

Without such limits

Tillich states: It is

the Christian concept of agape "which makes the cultural eros
responsible and the mystical~ personal. 1127
bility of the cultural

This responsi-

is central to his analysis of the
second function of life, namely, self-creativity. 28
~

This brief analysis of

~'

of its distortions in terms

of pride and concupiscence, and of a possible remedy for these
distortions in terms of agape, clarifies and exemplifies the
basic· framework of Tillich's thought in his analysis of life:
Life which is indeterminate and without proper limits is-threatened with its own potentiality.

This brief analysis also

2 7ill£., p. 118.
28 rn his Love Power and Justice, Tillich attempts to show
the importance of £fie concept of person and the personal for
Christian faith and theology by his analysis of a~ape. He compares the personal aspects of Christianity with t e impersonal
aspects of other religions. He does this especially in some of
his later works where he shows a great interest in a comparison
of Christianity with eastern religions. He thinks that Christianity's personalism (which has so shaped Western thought) and
the ~st's impersonalism can find a synthesis in the transpersonal.
In his Christianitv and the .&icounter of World Reli ions
(New York: Co um ia University Press, 1 3 , illich states that
contemporary man will be more comfortable in his God-talk when
it is put into transpersonal terms. This is reflected in Tillich's own vocabulary for God: The Unconditional, The Absolute,
The Ground and Abyss of Being.

4?
provides a good introduction to understanding what is the central concern in Tillich's analysis of the second function of
life: the responsibility of the cultural eros.
The Second Function of Life:
Self-Creativity
The second function of life in Tillich's existential consideration of life is the function of self-creativity.

Tillich

analyzes this function in terms of the second polarity in the
structure of being: Dynamics and form.

In this function, self-

al teration is emphasized, new centers are produced.

Tillich is

concerned with growth and, especially under the dimension of
the spirit, culture.

Again, the analysis ot this function can

be made in terms of the self-transcendence of life and the
experience of the transcendent.

Tillich is concerned with self-

transcendence as the cultural activity of man.

He is concerned

with the experience of the transcendent as the norms and values
which can determine cultural activity as creative, and not as
destructive. 29
To summarize, power or dynamics in terms of man's cultural
activity is ambiguous and in need of norms and values; otherwise
life is chaotic and tragic.

In his consideration of the second

function of life, Tillich attempts to refute cultural relativism
and to confront humanism.

In doing the latter he must turn to

29Tillich is concerned with a need for absolutes. This is
quite evident in his [;Jt Search for Absolutes (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1967), \:/ere Tillich investigates the destructive
tendencies of various relativistic approaches to truth, moral
decision, and the experience of the holy in religious experience.
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the third function of life: religion.
Culture, etymologically defined is: "Culture - is that
which takes care of something, keeps it alive, makes it grow."30
"• •• Culture creates something new beyond the encountered
reality.n3l

The ambiguity of culture is that human activity

can be creative or chaotically destructive.
in other words is that the "new, " the
opportunity or threat.

'~novel

The ambiguity,
n can be either

Again, for Tillich, the question is:

what can determine it to be one and not the other.

Again, the

possible answer is in terms of defined limits, in this case,
in terms of forms or cultural values and absolutes.
In attempting to analyze cultural activity Tillich focuses
upon language as a primary cultural vehicle.
meaning is created.

In language,

Through the word, "something new beyond

encountered reality is created."

Tillich's critique of language ~xemplifies his general critique of culture.3 2
Tillich speaks eloquently of the fundamental ambiguity of
language.
The inherent ambiguity of language is that in
transforming reality into meaning it separates mind
and reality. Countless examples could be given, but
one can distinguish the following main kinds of ambiguity of the word: the poverty in the midst of richness
that falsifies that which is grasped through neglect
30Tillich,

§!,

Vol. III, p. 57.

31~.

32since so much of contemporary philosophical and theological writing is concerned with the function and use of language
as a primary expressive and creative tool in human experience,
Tillich's emphasis upon the role of language in cultural growth
and especially in theological development makes him particularly
appealing to contemporary readers.
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of innumerable other possibilities; the limitation on
universality imposed by expressing definite encounter
with reality in a particular structure that is strange
to other linguistic structures and the indefiniteness
within definite meaning that leads to the betrayal o.f
the mind by words, the ultimately uncommunicative
character of this main tool of communication as a result
of the unintended as well as intended connotation in
the self of the centered person; the unlimited character of the freedom of language when limitations by persons or objects are rejected, the empty talk and reaction against it, the flight into silence; the nanipulation of language for the sake of purposes with no basis
in reality such as flattery, polemics, intoxication,
propaganda; and finally, the perversion of language to
the exact opposite of the function intended by the selfcreative power of life through hiding, distorting and
contradicting that which it is supposed to present.33
As with language, so it is with culture for Tillich!

Both

the use of language and cultural activity can be destructive in
one of two ways: a relativism which renders power formless and
valueless or a formalism in which power is encumbered and restricted by forms.

In either case, what could have been self-

creative becomes self-destructive.
Just as the experience of the "other self" or "otheI_' person"
is the beginning of the moral experience, that is, the experience
of a true limit for man's basically unlimited power to assimilate
all and to dispose of all; and just as this experience of the
moral transcendent is the possibility and demand for love, so
the experience of the cognitive other, "the definite object,"
is the beginning of the cognitive
and demand for truth.

experience and the possibility

In terms of the polarity of dynamics and

form, Tillich analyzes the cognitive act as he speaks of the
33Tillich,

§!,

Vol. III, P• 69.
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basic subject-object split in all knowledge.34

Tillich attempts

to provide a framework out of which he can describe the cognitive act without falling into either an objectless subjectivism
or a subjectless objectivism.

The unlimited, or infinite power

of the subject to know is limited by the form or facticite of
the world to be encountered.

Subjectivism or objectivism is

ultimately destructive of truth.35
The ambiguities of the cognitive act of the selfcreation of life are rooted in the split between subject and object. This split is the precondition of all
knowledge and, at the same time, the negative power in
all knowledge. The whole history of epistemology is a
cognitive attempt to bridge this split by showing the
ultimate unity of subject ~nd object, either by annihilating one side of the gap for the sake of the other
or by establishing a uniting principle which contains
both of them.36
As Tillich considers the cognitive aspect of the self-creative
function, in like manner he considers the aesthetic act and its
ambiguity.
In artistic intuition and its images, a reunion or
theoria and reality, which otherwise could not be reached,
is believed possible. But the aesthetic image is no
less ambiguous than the cognitive concept and the
34 This subject-object split is overcome in mystical knowledge. For Tillich, highpoints in religious experience are those
ecstatic moments when the oneness of everything is glimpsed.
This is one of the reasons that Tillich had a special interest
in Western as well as Eastern mysticism.
35For Tillich knowledge is rooted in the basic intentioL·
ality of man. The subject-object split is grounded in what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the primordial unity of man-world. Both
objectivist and subjectivist theories of truth neglect the original unity of man-world. This approach to intentionality is well
summarized in Merleau-Ponty's preface to his Phenomenology of
Perception (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), pp. xvii-xxi.
36 Tillich, §!, Vol. III, p. ?O.
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grasping word. In the aesthetic function the gap
between expression and that which is expressed represents the split between the acts of theoria and encountered reality. The ambiguities resulting from this
split can be shown in the conflict of stylistic elements which characterize every work of art - and
indirectly, every aesthetic encounter with reality.37
Language, the cognitive function, and the aesthetic function provide for Tillich examples of the self-creative function
of life.

Indeed his consideration of them demonstrates his

analysis of this second function of life in terms of the selftranscendence of life and the experience of the transcendent.
A Criticism of Humanism
Tillich concludes his consideration of the second function
. of life and specifically his critique·of man's cultural activity
by offering a criticism of humanism.

This conclusion provides

him with a logical point of departure for his consideration of
religion, the third function of the spirit and the self-transcendence of life defined in a specific way.
For Tillich, the root idea of humanism is that "only in
man does the universe reach up to an anticipatory and fragmentary fulfillment. 11 38 Yet Tillich has difficulties with humanism's attempt to provide norms and values either for morality
or culture.

"The ambiguities of humanism are based on the fact

that as humanism, it disregards the self-transcending function
of life and absolutizes the self-creative function."39

3?Ibid.,
............. p. ?2 •

38 Ibid., p. 85.
39Ibid.
~
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Here Tillich is referring to the specific concept of the
self-transcendence of life, that is, finite life transcending
itself as finite.

For humanism, man is the ultimate norm, the

final criterion, his own limit.

According to humanism, religion

is one of the many cultural creations of man.

"Humanism actu-

ally denies the self-transcendence of life and with it the
innermost character of religion. 1140
Man cannot be his own norm.

Man's ultimate experience of

the transcendent must not be man or humanity, not an experience
of self-limitation.

For Tillich, religion offers man the pos-

sibility of a self-transcendence beyond finite life itself and
the possibility of the experience of ultimate limitations and
limitedness, ultimate otherness, the ultimate source of values
and norms, the absolute ground of truth and love.
offers man an experience of the holy.

Religion

Humanism is restrictive

and reductive; it "fails to consider the human predicament and
its existential estrangement. 1141

Religion provides a higher

criticism whereas humanism allows man to become too easily a
victim of his own self-delusions and illusions.

Religion pro-

Vides substance for culture and an unconditional character for
morality.

For Tillich humanism's universe is still only "frag-

mentary and anticipatory."

Religion offers depth, something

that makes the fragmentary acceptable and the anticipatory
worthwhile.
4 oibid.
41

Ibid., p. 86.
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In summary, religion is necessary because man left to
himself is too easily victimized by what is superficial and
false, by what is, for the moment at least, attractive and
seemingly true and beneficial.

Religion is necessary

becau~e

man, despite his estrangement, has glimpses and hints of
dimensions of life which are unfathomable and mysterious.
Religion is necessary for Tillich because man should never be
too sure who he is and where he is going.
being is mystery.

For Tillich, 'life as

Humanism is quick to make man ultimate and

normative and remove the mystery.

In other words and in a more

concrete way, Tillich states that ordinary language is not able
to open the depths of culture and ensure the unconditional
character of morality.
man's

self~integration

With religious language and symbolism,
and self-creation is deepened, evaluated,

directed, judged and grounded.

In other words, religion offers

man the possibility of the experience of the holy, the experience
of God, the ultimate ground of being and meaning.

Without reli-

gion as the self-transcendence of life and without the religious
experience of the Transcendent, culture loses its depth and
morality its.unconditional character.
A Summary
In chapter one Tillich's essential consideration of life
was analyzed.

His definition of life used terms which, according

to the way Tillich defined them, indicated a fundamental framework in Tillich's thought;

pot~ntiality,

if it is to be actual-

ized in a creative and non-destructive way, needs proper limits.

~

In chapter two Tillich's existential consideration of life
was analyzed: Life is ambiguous because it can go either way;
it can be creative and great, or it can be self-destructive and
tragic.

I! life is to be creative and great, it needs deter-

mination, or limits.

In chapter two the first two functions of

life were analyzed: Self-integration and self-creativity.

In

analyzing the first function of life, Tillich focused especially
upon morality and in analyzing the second function he was
especially concerned with culture.
To better understand his analyses, a schema of two corresponding realities was pointed out to clarify the fundamental
structure of his existential consideration of life: l) the
self-transcendence.of life, the fundamental characteristic of
life, and 2) the experience of the transcendent, the experience
of limitation or limits.
of~

A brief analysis of Tillich's concepts

and agape was·presented to clarify and exemplify these

two corresponding realities as a fundamental structure in his
thought.
Finally, Tillich's criticism of humanism was analyzed since
in this criticism Tillich states the need for religion if
morality is not to lose its unconditional·character and culture
its depth.
In chapter three, Tillich's consideration of the third

function of life will be analyzed: the self-transcendence of
life.

Tillich defines religion as the self-transcendence of

life under the dimension of the spirit.

This definition will

be analyzed and, again, the schema of two corresponding
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realities will provide the basic structure for the analysis:
the self-transcendence of life, Tillich's definition of
religion, and the experience of the transcendent, religiously
expressed as the experience of the holy.

CHAPrER III
THE SPECIFIC CONCEPr OF THE SELF-TRANSCENDENCE OF LIFE
In terms of the self-transcendence of life and the exper-

ience of the transcendent, specifically in terms of the polarity
of individualization and participation, Tillich considered the
first function of life, self-integration.
primary object of this consideration.

Morality was the

Tillich was faced with

the problem-question of limits--moral norms--what could provide
life's ambiguity with the possibility of some resolution, some
positive determination.
In terms of the self-transcendence of life and the experience of the transcendent but specifically in terms of the
polarity of dynamics and form Tillich considered the second
function of life, self-creativity.
object of this consideration.

Culture was the primary

Tillich was faced again with

the problem-question of limits--cultural values--again, what
could provide life's ambiguity with the possibility of some
resolution, some positive determination.
In both cases, without these limits, life is indeterminate
and chaotic.

It is faced with the threat of self-disintegration,

the risk of self-destruction.

In both cases life is ambiguous.

In his considerations of morality and culture Tillich discusses
the possibility of limits, norms, and values, yet in neither
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case is Tillich completely satisfied with the possible answers,
the possible limits.
The Third Function of Life: Self-transcendence
In his consideration of the third function of life, the
self-transcendence of life, Tillich's primary object of consideration is religion.

The basic structure of the self-transcen-

dence of life and of the experience of the transcendent is
expressed in the third function in terms of the third polarity
in the very structure of being, the polarity of freedom and
destiny.

Again, Tillich is faced with the problem-question of

limits--absolute norms and ultimate values.

Morality and culture

may pose questions and demand some attempt at answers, but it
is religion which poses ultimate questions and the possibility
of a final resolution to life's ambiguity, the ultimate and
absolute positive determination.

In his consideration of the

third function of life, Tillich uses a specific concept of the
self-transcendence of life, where "life moves beyond itself as
finite • • • n 1 Religion is concerned with life's ambiguity
looking for-resolution in the infinite, the ultimate, the unconditional, the absolute, the eternal.

For Tillich the religious

experience of the transcendent is expressed and can be analyzed
in terms of some traditional religious categories: the holy,
the sacred, the mysterious, the other, the sublime.
Tillich states that the movement for the third function of
1 Tillich,

.§!,

Vol. III,

P•

31.
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life is vertical.

"Life drives beyond itself as finite life. 112

Here life is "driving toward the sublime."3

"The words 'sub-

lime,' 'sublimation,' 'sublimity,' point to a going beyond
limits toward the great, the solemn, the high. 114

In the third

function Tillich considers the supreme self-actualization of
life.
Life, in degrees is free fro.m its elf, from a total
bondage to its own finitude. It is striving in the
vertical direction toward ultimate and infinite being.
The vertical transcends both the circular line of centeredness and the horizontal line of growth.)
Not only is the third flinction different from the previous two
insofar as in this function life transcends itself as finite,
but it is also different insofar as the specific self-transcendence of life and the specific experience of the transcendent
manifest themselves in a completely different way.

Hence in

the third function of life, the method of investigation is quite
different.
The question as to how the self ~transcendence of
life manifests itself cannot be answered in empirical
terms as is possible in the case of self-integration
and self-creativity. One can speak about it only in
terms which describe the reflection of the inner selftranscendence of things in man's consciousness. Man
is the.mirror in which the relation of everything
finite to the infinite becomes conscious. No empirical observation of this relation is possible, because
all empirical knowledge refers to finite interdependences, not to the relation of the finite to the infinite.6
2rbid.

-

3~.
4 Ibid.

5rbid., p. 56.
6

~., p. 8?.

[Obviously, Tillich is opposed to those
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Because Tillich's methodology is phenomenological, that is
an analysis of what appears in human consciousness, his consideration of religion and the religious dimension of man·is
directed at religious symbols and language, images and mythic
structures.

According to Tillich, by anlyzing and interpreting

man's religious symbols and metaphors one can approach what is
reflected in the mirror of human consciousness.

\t/hat is reflec-

ted in the mirror of human consciousness and necessarily expressed symbolically and metaphorically is the religious experience of the transcendent,

~he

sublime, or, as Tillich more

traditionally states it, the experience of the holy.

In analyz-

ing this experience of tne holy Tillich attempts his analysis
of the third function of life and provides the foundations for
his philosophical understanding of religion and the religious
dimension of man.
The .Experience of the Holy
According to Tillich, the experience of the holy is not
the experience of any particular object arising in consciousness.

He is not interested in finding ! god or any other con-

crete holy being.

For Tillich a definition of what is funda-

mentally infinite is a contradiction in terms and the beginning
of the end to any experience of the holy, the beginning of
positivistic and empiricist theories of knowledge which hold
that man can know only what is quantified and measurable.
There are aspects of human consciousness which a strictly
scientific model of investigation cannot cope with.] ·
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superstitious and false limits.

Instead, the experien¢e of· the

holy is a way of experiencing the objects that do arise in
consciousness; it is a way of experiencing life and being.
The experience of the holy is qualitative.
This distinction is crucial for an understanding of
Tillich's approach to religion and God and especially his analysis of religious language and symbolism.

In his many attempts

to interpret religious language and speech, Tillich often
directs his thought against objectivist and literalist interpretations of the symbolic and metaphorical.

He is a demytholo-

gizer, if myth is defined as man's attempt to objectify, reify,
personify, and quantify qualitative aspects within human subjectivity.
For Tillich, to experience something in a holy way is to
experience its greatness and its dignity, whether that something
be some concrete object or whether that something be life
itself, reality itself, or being itself.

Religious speech is

really concerned with attitude; its referent is not a "what"
but a "how."
The experience of the holy is the experience of greatness:
The greatness of life in the sense of self-transcendence is qualitative. The great in the qualitative
sense shows a power of being and meaning that makes it
a representative of ultimate being and meaning and gives
it a dignity of such representation.7
Such an understanding presupposes a particular metaphysical
approach to reality, which on the philosophical level can be

? Ibid.,
.
p. 88.
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described as a participation theory of being and on the theological level can be described as sacramental.

Whatever is exper-

ienced as holy is experienced as pointing to deeper meaning
and being.
To experience something as holy is not only to experience
its greatness but also its dignity.
bility.

Dignity signifies inviola-

From the inorganic to spiritual dimension, the dignity

of whatever is experienced is set against its possible violability, its possible exploitation.

Tillich's thought at this

point is again quite similar to the thought of Martin Buber
who expresses this distinction. in terms of his famed I-Thou
and I-It distinction as ways of experiencing anything. 8 Like
Buber, Tillich offers some cautious criticism of technology and,
in terms of this aspect of the experience of the holy, describes
how religion ideally functions to protect the inviolability
of all things.~
The self-transcendence of life in the specific sense is
concerned with life moving beyond itself as finite.

The exper-

ience of the transcendent at this point is the experience of
the holy, the experience of greatness and dignity.

Opposed to

the self-transcendence of life is the profanization of life
and opposed to the holy is the profane.
8 Buber, I and Thou.
9Tillich, ST, Vol. III, p. 90. [For example, as an historian of religIOns, Tillich comments "how polytheism often did
a better job in this regard than did monotheism. The one God
has the tendency to deprive all things of their dignity andj
therefore, rob reality of the very thing it should protect.
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The Profane, The Holy, and the Demonic
The profane resists the holy.

What is experienced as

profane is experienced as not representative, as "shallow," as
not pointing to any deeper or ultimate being or meaning.
is experienced as disposable, usable, violable.

It

The profane

bespeaks the smallness of violability of all things, of life
and reality in general.
Not only is the holy opposed by the profane from one direction, but it is also opposed from the opposite direction.
Here Tillich adds a third key word to his basic vocabulary
for an analysis of religion: the demonic.

The demonic does not

resist the holy, it distorts the holy by claiming for some
particular thing the ultimacy and depth to which the particular
should point.

The demonic is the idolatrous, the deified.

This profane-holy-demonic model especially in terms of the
greatness of life, provides Tillich with a methodological structure for a critical understanding and evaluation of religion and
the religions of man.

From one direction the holy is resisted

by the profane and the greatness of life is reduced to smallness.

From the other direction the holy is distorted by the

demonic and the greatness of life is disfigured and becomes the
tragedy of life.
From one direction greatness becomes smallness:
Only smallness, the fear of reaching beyond one's
finitude, the readiness to accept the finite because
it is given, the tendency to keep vne's self within
the limits of the ordinary, the average existence and
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its security--only smallness radically conflicts with
the greatness and dignity of life.10 ·
The smallness of life is the radical profanization of life.
Life· is not experienced as holy.

As with the other experiences

of the transcendent, the problem-question for Tillich is in
terms of limits and limitations.

The profane is a matter of

false limits; it is restrictive and demeaning.

It is a matter

of over-limitation, a too-limited experience of life.

This

radical profanization of life, according to Tillich, is manifested in various empirical and positivist theories of moral
value.

In both cases, according to Tillich, what can be great

is made small, if not petty and trivial.
From the other direction greatness becomes tragedy:
The classical example is the Greek hero, who
represents the highest power and value within the
group to which he belongs. Through his greatness
he comes near to the divine sphere in which the
fulfillment of being and meaning is seen in divine
figures. But if he trespasses the limits of his
finitude, he is thrown back upon it by the "anger _
of the gods." Greatness implies risk and the willingness of the great to take tragedy upon themselves. 11
If one asks what the guilt of the tragic hero is,
the answer must be that he perverts the function of
self-transcendence by identifying himself with that
to which self-transcendence is directed--the great
itself. He does not resist the demand to transcend
his own greatness. He is caught by his own pQwer of
representing the self-transcendence· of life.12
The tragic is the elevation of something beyond its proper
limits.

Again, Tillich is faced with the problem-question of

lOibid., p. 88.

-

llill,9;.
12:tbid., P• 94.
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transcendence, the experience of limitation and limitedness.
·Whereas the smallness of life is a matter of over-limitation
and restriction, the tragedy of life is a matter of non-limitation; the finite identifies itself with the infinite.

It is

not a matter of restriction but a matter of arrogance.

The

demonic distorts the holy; idolatry exemplifies this.

Til-

lich's criticism of the tragic hero is similar to his criticism
of humanism.

Man becomes his own experience of transcendence.

He becomes his own norm and source 0£ value.

Self-criticism

is the only criticism left to him.
It can be stated at this point quite simply what is the
ambiguity of life for the third function of life: To avoid the
smallness of life, greatness must be attempted with the risk
of tragedy.

The great stands between the small and the tragic,

between restriction and arrogance.

In other words, the subhuman

and the superhuman are both inhuman.
The religious experience of the transcendent, the experience of the holy as the experience of ultimate limitation
and limitedness, is the possibility of a solution-answer to the
problem-question posed by the ambiguity of life.

For Tillich,

man attempts to express, communicate, and even create the
experience of the holy (the experience of the greatness and
dignity of the mystery of life) with the things of religion:
religious language and symbolism, ritual and liturgy, prophets
and saints.

With religion man can cotinteract his tendency to

restrict life and make himself small.

Religion and the things

of religion can excite his imagination and focus his attention
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upon the dpeth and richness of being.
less situation.

It can recreate a hope-

Religion can offer promise in the face of

despair.
With religion man can also counteract his tendency to live
his life arbitrarily, i.e., without the norms and values which
can protect him, his neighbor, and his world from the tragedy of
unlimited power.
presumptuous.

Religion can accuse man when he tends to be

Yith the things of religion man has the possi-

bility of experiencing the holy, that is, the ultimacy, seriousness, and depth which can keep life great and dignified.

With

religion man can protect himself from himself; religion as
ultimate promise and accusation provides man with the critical
insights necessary to judge and appreciate his cultural activity and moral responsibility.
Religion, Culture, and Morality
Tillich's philosophy of religion attempts to avoid-isolating religion and the religious dimension of man.

Just as he

refused to use the metaphor of "level" when speaking of life in
order to avoid certain unnecessary discontinuities, so Tillich
refuses to discuss religion as separate from culture and morality.

The three interpenetrate in the spiritual dimension.
In accordance with their essential nature,
morality, culture, and religion interpenetrate one
another. They constitute the unity of the spirit,
wherein the elements are distinguishable but not
separable.13

l3lbid.' p. 95.

-
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Tillich defined morality as "the constitution of the person
in the encounter with other persons. 1114

Morality is related to

cul tur.e: "Culture provides the content of morali ty--the concrete
ideals of personality and community, and the changing laws of
ethical wisdom. 111 5

Morality is related to religion; "Religion

gives to morality the unconditional character of the moral
imperative, the ultimate moral aim. 16 ·
Tillich briefly states the relationship of the three functions of the spirit from the viewpoint of culture:
Culture, or the creation of a universe of meaning
in theoria and praxis, is essentially related to morality and religion. The validity of cultural creativity
in all its functions is based on the person-to-person
encounter in which limits to arbitrariness are established. without the force of t~e moral imperative, no
demand coming from the logical, aesthetic, personal,
and communal forms could be felt. The religious element in culture is the inexhaustible depth of a genuine
creation. One may call it substance or the ground from
~hich culture lives.
It is the element of ultimacy
which culture lacks in itself but to which it points. 17
Tillich states the relationship between the three from a
viewpoint of religion:
Religion, or the self-transcendence of life under
the dimension of the spirit, is essentially related to
morality and culture. There is no self-transcendence
under the dimension of the spirit without the constitution of the moral self by the unconditional imperative, and this self-transcendence cannot take form
except within the universe of meaning created in the
cultural act.18
14

Ibid., P• 95.

l5Ibid.
16Ibid.
17~.

18Ibid.

-
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According to Tillich religion, morality, and cultlire have
an essential unity.

Religion, ·essentially stated, is a "quality

of the two other functions of the spirit and not an independent
func.tion. ul9

Tillich's definition of religion as the self-

transcendence of life under the dimension of the spirit "makes
the image of the essential unity of religion with morality
and culture possible • • • • 1120 "The self-transcendence of life
is effective in the unconditional character of the moral act
and in the exhaustible depth of meaning in all meaning created
by culture. 1121 But existentially speaking, religion becomes an
independent function.

It is not just a quality of the other two.

It has its own proper role and task, often in conflict existen-.
tially with culture and morality.

"The three functions of life.

under the dimension of spirit separate in order to become
actual. 1122
· As actual and independent, morality and culture separated
from religion tend toward profanization or demonization.

Accord-

ing to Tillich, morality as existentially separated from religion, loses its unconditional character.
ground for moral responsibility.

Religion provides the

As Tillich rejected humanism

for being incomplete, so he rejects secularism.

"Morality and

culture in existential separation from religion become what is
usually called 'secular•.n 2 3 Culture, as existentially separated
l9Ibid., P• 96.
20 Ibid.
21~.

22~.' p. 95.

~.,

23

P• 97.
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from religion, loses its ultimate character, its depth·.

Re'li-

gion provides man with the experience of the holy which for
Tillich, therefore, is most aptly described in terms of the
ultimate and unconditional.

The holy ultimately and uncondi-

tionally criticizes man's illusions, his reductionisms and his
self-aggrandizements.

Secular man stands ambiguously between

smallness and tragedy; religion provides the possibility of an
answer, a solution, a resolution, the possibility of unambiguous life.
The Ambiguity of Religion
As independent, that is, as actual and not merely as
essential, religi'on is in a state of ambiguity.

Religion

responds not without ambiguity to the secular situation.
out of this situation religion arises as a special
function of the spirit • • • Religion as the selftranscendence or life needs the religions and needs
to deny them. Basically they need to be denied because
religion as a separate function shares a double ambiguity • • • • 1124
In his analysis of religion, Tillich is faced with the relationship of religion as a function of life to the many expressions
of religion in time and space: the religions.

Tillich is faced

with "an interpretation of the history of religion. 112 5

The

religious self-transcendence of life and the religious experience of the transcendent are existentially and, therefore,
ambiguously expressed in the religions.
24 Ibid.

-

25Ibid., PP• 94-5.
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Tillich's interpretation of the history of religions is
primarily made in terms of what he states is the "double ambiguity" of religion.
One can say that religion always moves between
the danger points of profanization and demonization
and that in every genuine act of the religious life
both are present, openly or covertly.26
Religion is profaned when it is just

~nother

finite object,

another cultural creation, just another institution or. organization!

Religion is demonic when it elevates the conditional

or finite to unconditional or infinite validity.

Tillich exem-

plified this by a criticism of dogmas, doctrines, rituals,
and churches which tend to absolutize themselves. 27
,Tillich states that religion can profanize itself in two
major ways: the institutional and the reductive.
Instead of transcending the finite in the direcof the infinite, institutional religion actually
becomes a finite reality itself - a set of prescribed
activities to be performed, a set of stated doctrines
to be accepted, a social pressure group along with
others, a political power with all the implications
of power politics.28

~ion

There is another, the "reductive" way, based on
the fact that culture is the form of religion and
that morality is the expression of its seriousness.
This fact can lead to the reduction to culture or
morality • • • • 29

26Tillich, .§!, Vol. III, p. 98.
2 7Ibid., p. 1?6.

CHere Tillich briefly mentions his
famous-I5ro:testant principle, a needed ~rotest against this
demonization tendency in all religion.J
28

2

~., PP• 99-100.

9~., p. 100.

?O
In reaction to the ways that religion profanizes itself
Tillich provides some definitions of religion more specific
than his definition of religion as the self-transcendence of
life under the dimensions of the spirit; he speaks of "the
larger concept of religion as experience of the unconditional,
both in the moral imperative and in the depth of culture."30
Also in reaction to this profanization, Tillich defines religion
in a way which sets forth his understanding of religion as
existentially an independent function and essentially as not
independent.
Reductive profanization may succeed in abolishing religion as a special function, but it is not
able to remove religion as a quality that is found
in all functions of the spirit--the quality of ulti'mate concern.31
·
Ultimate concern is one of the most famous phrases from Tillich's vocabulary; his definition of faith and religion!

Human-

ism and secularism are faced with religious issues, with religious question-problems, when they must concern themselves with
the foundations for morality and culture, when they must find
some answer-solution to the problem-question of life's ambiguity:
What are the limits, the limitations within which and towards
which life's movement can be creative and not ultimately selfdestructive?

What are the possibilities for the unambiguous

life?
Tillich ends his treatment of religion as the self-

-

30ibid.' p.· 102.
31~.

?l
transcendence of life under the dimension of the spirit by
stating the fundamental ambiguity of religion.

Religion is not

the answer-solution to the question-problem posed by the ambiguity of life.

Religion is the possibility of an answer-solution:

"for religion is the point at which the answer for the quest
for the unambiguous life is received. 11 32 Religion is the point
where the quest is most clearly evident.
revelation, as philosophy is not theology.

But religion is not
In accordance with

his basic method of correlation, that is, a correlation of
philosophical question and theological answer, Tillich ends
the first division of Pa.rt IV of his Systematic Theology by
distinguishing religion,_ where the ultimate questions are
directly asked and where the ultimate answers are received,
from revelation, the "answer for the quest for the unambiguous
life."
If in religion, the great is called the holy,
this indicates that religion is based on the manifestation of the holy itself, the divine ground of being.
~very religion is the receptive answer to revelatory
experiences. This is the greatness and dignity.33
Although religion and its expressions are holy, religion
is not unambiguously holy, Religion is not revelation.

Tillich

regards this ambiguity of religion especially in regard to
religion's relationship to the other two functions of the spirit.
Religion in this respect (that is, the respect
of man's possibility of receiving an answer) is unambiguous; the actual reception, however, is profoundly

32 Ibid., p. 104.
33rbid., p. 99.

?2

ambiguous, for it occurs in the changing forms or· man's
moral and cultural existence. These forms participate
in the holy to which they point, but they are not the
holy itself. The claim to be the holy itself makes
them demonic.34
Religion is afflicted with this proround ambiguity and yet
moral and cultural man cannot do without religion.
is

"Religion

!!2! the answer to the quest for unambiguous life, although

the answer can only be received through religion. 11 35
A Summary
In chapter three Tillich's definition of religion as the
self-transcendence of life under the dimension of the spirit
was analyzed.

It was shown that his consideration of the third

function of life and its ambiguity could be outlined in terms
of two corresponding realities: 1) the self-transcendence of
life specifically in the sense of life going outside of itself
as finite and 2) the religious experience of the transcendent,
the experience of the holy.
In analyzing the experience of the holy and its distortions, the profane and the demonic, Tillich once again indicated
a central question or concern in his thought: a need for correct
limits and determinations.

The holiness of life without proper

limits becomes the smallness of life and without limits at rll
becomes the tragedy of life.
For Tillich religion provides man with the possibility of
34Ib.d

__!_·' p. 104.

35Ibid. t p. 106.
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an experience of the holy.

It is with religious language and

symbolism that man attempts to express and communicate this
profound experience.

Yet religion cannot be a function separate

from the other two functions of the spirit: culture and morality.

Although inseparable from culture and morality, religion

does have an independent function since morality tends to lose
its unconditional character and culture tends to become shallow
and lose its depth.

Religion as the possibility of an exper-

ience of the holy provides man with the possibility of an unconditional, ultimate ground for moral and cultural norms and
values.
Religion is not the holy, but provides man with the possibility of experiencing the holy and expressing it.

Religion

provides man with the ultimate questions, with the quest for
unambiguous life.

Religion like life itself is ambiguous.

It

often asks the wrong questions; it formulates its questions
within some particular moral and cultural milieu, the received
answer is never absolutely clear or infallible.

Yet religion

is where there is a possibility of receiving an answer.
For Tillich, the answer itself is a matter of revelation.
An analysis of the answer, in this case, an analysis of unam-

biguous life, is a theological task.

This is the task Tillich

sets before himself in the second section of Part IV: the theological analysis of Spirit as the answer to the quest for the
unambiguous life.

Chapter three attempted to analyze Tillich's

understanding of religion as the function of the spirit which
forces man to face the question of ambiguous life and makes him
receptive to some answer.

CONCLUSION
Anyone interested in contemporary thought about religion
and the religious dimension of man cannot easily avoid the
contributions made by Paul Tillich.

He has been widely read

and his thought has influenced many contemporary thinkers.
Many have been his devoted pupils; many have evaluated and
criticized his contributions to the philosophy of religion.
Some of his vocabulary has become almost standard for anyone
involved in speaking about religion and the things of religion.
Much of Tillich's work has been concerned with providing
man with a vocabulary, often strange and untraditional, to
express, understand, and communicate the hopes and experiences
which
underlie religious
phenomena. Tillich focused much of
.
.
his attention upon man's use of words, symbols, myths, and
images to articulate his religious depths.

But often, Tillich's

own terminology and statements proved difficult to understand
and somewhat confusing.

This paper has attempted to analyze

some of the principles, definitions, and terms of Paul Tillich's
philosophy of religion.

The attempt was made by focusing upon

Tillich's thought in Part IV of his Systematic Theology.

In

this part of his monumental work Tillich considered religion
and the religious dimension of man in terms of ambiguous and
unambiguous life.

?4

?5

In the hope of presenting a systematic treatment Tillich
in Part IV used the concept of life to organize and develop
his thought.

With the basic distinction of ambiguous and

unambiguous life, Tillich hoped to find a starting point especially conducive for a dialogue between his own theologicalreligious perspective and the insights of modern science.

By

using this concept of life Tillich formulated some principles,
definitions, and terms by which he hoped religion and the religious dimension of man could be more· clearly evaluated, criticized, and appreciated by contemporary man.
This paper attempted to analyze this fundamental concept
of life not so much to show how it functioned in Part IV as
the organizing concept but so that some of the principles,
definitions, and terms of Tillich's philosophy of religion
could be better understood.

In attempting to present its

analysis this paper tried to make two important points.
First, Tillich's use of the concept of life and of the
fundamental distinction of ambiguous and unambiguous life
points to a fundamental and perduring concern in his thought.
Man has tremendous potential especially in terms of personal
growth and cultural activity, but his potential without creative limits can become tragic and self-destructive.

Man

needs limits, norms, values, ultimates and absolutes by which
he can create, direct, organize, integrate his life.
proper orientation human life is chao'tic.

Without

Man is in need of

order; he needs justification. ·perhaps, Tillich's Lutheran
heritage is most apparent in this concern.

What was apparent
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as the analysis of this paper was ·being made was that, in terms
of life, Tillich was once again restating a fundamental and
central concern in his thought.
Secondly, this paper attempted to provide a schema or
structure to better understand Tillich's analyses in Part IV.
By utilizing this schema of two corresponding realities (the
self-transcendence of life and the experience of the transcendent), this paper attempted to clarify his analysis of the
three functions of life (self-integration, self-creativity,
and self-transcendence) and the three functions of the spirit
(morality, culture, and religion).

This schema hoped to

provide a structure by which Tillich's analysis of religious
transcendence and the religious experience of the transcendent
could be better understood especially in relation to the
transcendence and the experience of the transcendent in moral
responsibility and cultural creativity.
By making these two points this paper attempted not only
to make more intelligible Tillich's thought in Part IV of his
Systematic

Theolo~

but also to make some contribution to a

better understanding of Tillich's thought in general.
Paul Tillich was a Protestant Christian theologian and
a philosophical thinker who attempted to share his faith
insights and philosophical reflections with contemporary men.
He wanted to speak about man's hopeful possibilities and about
the deep foundations for those possibilities.
was quite critical of this human potential.
for limits, norms, and absolutes.

Yet, Tillich
He saw man's needs

For Tillich, religion with
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its language and symbols, with its heroes and
man with ultimate limits.

provides

Religion can protect man from his

own tendency to be victimized by his own
delusions.

prophets~

il~usions

and self-

It can provide what humanism and the secular world

cannot, a criticism against the superficial, arbitrary, and
illusory and a promise that can excite and recreate man in
an otherwise threatening situation.
Paul Tillich's philosophy of religion was an attempt by
a theologian and philosopher to describe some men's experience
of criticism and promise in a situation mixed with opportunity
and threat.

This paper has attempted to analyze some of the

principles, definitions, and terms of his philosophy of
religion.
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